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 Combinatory analysis and design1     
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Abstract 
This paper is a response to the call for models of organization design as a science revealing the 
inner composition of organization and specifying the laws to be respected when crafting it.  
It maintains that the needed science is a chemistry of organization, addressing the combination of 
‘organizational elements’ playing a role analogous to that of chemical elements in composing a 
variety of substances. Drawing both on classic organization design theory and on configurational 
and complementarity-based approaches, the paper specifies a set of basic organizational elements 
and a set of combinatory laws regulating their effective combinations. Testable propositions are 
derived on the necessary and sufficient conditions that the composition of organizations should 
respect for achieving high levels of efficiency and innovation. These propositions are tested 
empirically on a sample of firms, using an innovative application of Boolean algebra. 
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Introduction 
Design has always been an important component of organization studies (e.g. Thompson 1967; 
Galbraith 1977; Mintzberg 1979), and it has recently gone through a phase of revitalization, with 
new contributions both in business administration (e.g. Hatchuel 2001; Romme 2003; Boland and 
Collopy 2004; Van Aken 2004; Grandori and Soda 2006; Burton et al. 2006) and organizational 
economics (Roberts 2004). 
This paper assesses some core features of classic and emergent approaches to organization 
design, and identifies a need for developing a new approach that responds more closely to the 
standards of a science of design. In particular, by comparing classic and recent approaches we 
identify a fundamental shift in the definition of the design problem: from the comparative 
assessment of historically given, frequently occurring, ‘forms’ of organization able to fit certain 
recurring circumstances (i.e. organization by product or function or matrix, hierarchy versus market 
versus clans, mechanistic versus organic systems, etc.); to the definition of design rules and 
processes capable of  generating solutions, able to fit any given particular situation.  
This shift promises to deliver an organizational engineering or architecture more proximate to a 
science of design than we used to have in the field. At the same time, it faces new challenging 
questions, not satisfactorily answered yet. In this respect, two important challenges will be 
addressed in this paper.  
First, what is the precise nature of these rules or laws generating superior organizational 
solutions? Among the rules considered in the previously cited contributions, some are about the 
social process among decision makers – i.e. how the players may talk to improve the attractiveness 
and creativity of the construction; while others are about how to combine organizational attributes – 
i.e. to what extent to employ hierarchy, teamwork, programs, pay for performance, specialization by 
function or product, etc. Both types of rules are relevant. This paper concentrates on the latter types 
of rules: the ‘technical’ rather than ‘relational’ rules that should be respected in designing 
organization. In fact, previous contributions have illuminated more the type of social and cognitive 
processes that may help design as a decision making process (Romme and Endenburg 2006), while 
much less has been said on the substantive ‘technical’ laws of combination that any solution may 
have to respect. These substantive basic rules of combination are arguably a component of design 
that can be conceived as a science: as much as an architect, while designing a house, should respect 
the basic laws of the static of construction and of physics; or as much as a chemist, devising a new 
drug, should respect the basic laws of chemistry; so the organization designer, while devising 
organizational arrangements, should respect some basic laws of composition of organizational 
elements. 
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Second, the paper addresses the problem of specifying the nature of organizational components 
or elements to be combined: what are the ‘building blocks’ of organization? How can they be 
conceived to predict their capacity of linking to each other and to produce different results?  
In response to these questions, the paper develops a ‘chemistry of organization’: a science 
specifying how the basic elements composing organization systems can be defined, how they can 
and cannot be combined, what results they produce in different combinations.  
This science fills a gap in recent design-oriented organization research concerned with 
organizational combinations, as it offers a theory for predicting combinations, something that has 
not been provided so far, neither in the configurational tradition in organization science, nor in the 
complementarity-based tradition in the economics of organization. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section is devoted to reviewing the achievements 
and limitations of the former approaches interested in organization design as combination of 
elements. In the first section we also highlight the specific contributions of these approaches that we 
retained to construct our combinative approach complementing those traditions and overcoming 
their limitations. The second section outlines some core propositions of the new science of 
‘organizational chemistry’. The final section presents an empirical study on a sample of firms, 
providing an initial test of those propositions employing a set-theoretic methodology. 
 
Constructing a Combinative Approach to Design: Inputs from Earlier Perspectives 
Various important approaches to organization design have conceived, implicitly or explicitly, 
organization forms as systems of interconnected attributes. These approaches constitute the starting 
scientific basis for our contribution, aimed at identifying basic elements of organizing and at 
specifying general combinatory laws among them. 
In the most important classic organization design paradigm, structural contingency theory, the 
effective shape of organization has been seen as a ‘consistent’ set of attributes, which fit to some 
relevant states of world. ‘Attributes’ typically included criteria for specializing units and modes for 
connecting them (more or less intense use of lateral communication, hierarchy, rules and 
procedures, teams, liaison roles, integration units, etc.) (Thompson 1967; Mintzberg 1979). The 
contextual variables, which those attributes should be contingently designed to, included 
environmental dynamism and uncertainty, strategies, technology, type of interdependence, system 
size. Organizational attributes and contextual variables have been connected through the notion of 
fit, understood in at least three ways in contingency studies (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985): 
selection fit, implying that structures misaligned with context will simply be selected out; 
interaction fit, understood as the bivariate interaction between pairs of context and structure 
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variables affecting performance; systemic fit, understood as the multivariate interaction of multiple 
structural characteristics and multiple context variables affecting performance.   
These notions of fit, as well as the notion of organization forms as ‘syndromes of attributes’, are 
traceable also in another important approach to organization design, namely transaction cost 
economics. That approach has delivered two contributions, not present in classic organizational 
design, that are particularly useful for our purposes. First, it has enlarged the portfolio of 
organizational attributes, by including incentives and price-like elements. Second, it has partitioned 
attributes into classes with specified, different, organizing properties, thereby defining families of 
attributes that ‘differ in kind’ (Williamson 2004). Typically, three kinds of attributes have been 
identified: market-like, bureaucratic and clan-like (Williamson and Ouchi 1981). These attributes 
were constructed in part by observing institutionalized, frequently adopted, packages of organizing 
techniques, and in part by assuming that attributes are consistent if they are ‘similar in kind’. 
Williamson (1991b) has been particularly explicit on that, and even stated the impossibility of 
‘selective intervention’, namely the impossibility to infuse attributes of different kinds into the same 
organizational system – for example, and in particular, to infuse market elements into firms, seen as 
the realm of plans and hierarchy.  
Of these two classical approaches to organization design, some ideas will be retained here, 
while some others will be put under revision. We retain the idea, common to both, that an 
organizational solution can be conceived as an array of ‘attributes’ – which we are going to define 
more precisely. We also acknowledge the need for defining what the ‘kinds’ or ‘types’ of attributes 
are, to be able to talk about combining elements that are ‘similar’ or ‘different’. However, we shall 
extend and refine the received three-fold classification in order to assess similarities and differences 
more precisely. We shall more radically question, instead, the ideas that organizational attributes 
can effectively combine only if they are ‘similar in kind’. In fact, theoretically, it is not clear why 
similar ingredients should be more complementary than different elements; empirically, ‘hybrid’ 
and ‘ambidextrous’ organizational solutions increasingly characterize the economic organization of 
firms. As to the notion of fit, we shall build on developments of the ‘systemic fit’ notion made 
available by the configurational and complementarity-based approaches illustrated below.  
 
Two important new perspectives have been more recently developing in the direction of a 
combinative approach to organization design: the ‘configurational’ approach in organization 
studies; and the ‘complementarity-based’ approach in organizational economics.  
The ‘configurational’ evolution of structural contingency theory (Miller and Friesen 1984; 
Meyer et al. 1993) has engaged in research on the actual combinations among wide arrays of 
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organizational devices (actually, devices of all sort, from formal rules and policies in budgetary 
processes or in personnel management, to task forces and committees, to  environmental scanning 
procedures, to central staff units, to the use of equity, and so on and so forth) and correlated these 
combinations with indicators of performance. These studies have hypothesized and tested that 
deviations from ‘ideal’ organizational configurations for a particular environment should result in 
lower performance (where the ‘ideal’ is typically identified empirically as the top performing 
configuration in a sample). Configurational studies provided a contingency approach that addressed 
some of the limitations of earlier contingency theory, but also lost some of its strengths. In 
particular, the configurational approach offers three contributions specifically useful for our 
purposes. First, it considered the possibility of interaction among organizational traits, rather than 
just pair-wise relations between organizational traits and environmental or otherwise external traits, 
thereby employing a notion of ‘systemic fit’ (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). Second, it admitted the 
possibility that more than one combination of traits might be effective under the same 
circumstances, stressing the concept of equifinality (Gresov and Drazin 1997). Third, it admitted the 
possibility of non linear and non monotonic relationships among the values of organizational 
characteristics (Meyer et al. 1993). On the weakness side, the configurational approach lost the 
capacity of predicting which combinations are going to be effective under what circumstances and 
why, a capacity that classic contingency theory derived from the information processing theory of 
organization.  
The complementarity-based approach to organization design, originating in organizational 
economics, has been pointing in a similar direction. Organizational ‘attributes’ have been more 
explicitly conceived as ‘practices’: packages of techniques, typically including structure, routinized 
action and know-how. In empirical studies, large sets of practices have been considered, such as 
teamwork and incentive pay, flexible job assignment and knowledge management (Laursen and 
Manke 2001; Ichniowski et al. 1997); or process and project organization, horizontal integration, 
delayering, outsourcing, and alliances (Whittington et al. 1999).  
The notion of fit among attributes has been extended and made more precise through the important 
notion of complementarity among organizational components. ‘Complementarity’ is a relation 
between elements whereby applying one practice raises the value of employing another practice 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1995). This design criterion has, in principle, many advantages: it includes 
interactions among organizational attributes (systemic fit), and not only their pair-wise fit with 
exogenous conditions; it specifies clearly what ‘consistency’ and ‘systemic fit’ mean; it is wider 
than consistency by  ‘similarity in kind’ as complementarities can also stem from differences. 
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However, among the limitations, the complementarity-based assessment of configurations is 
characterized by the same ‘theory loss’ as configurational studies: there is no theory allowing 
prediction and explanation of which organizational practice is complementary with which other.           
In the lack of that theory, the way of establishing which combinations are effective has been based 
only on the frequency of occurrence of combinations and their correlations with performance. 
However, in this way the complementarity argument is tautological: if what is complementary is 
defined as what performs best in combination, than by definition deviations from those high 
performing combinations entail lower performance; i.e. the explanatory law is inferred from the 
very pattern it should explain. 
 
Hence, we will retain some of the lessons of configurational and complementarity-based design 
approaches, in particular, the complementarity-based notion of systemic fit and the concept of 
equifinality; but we intend to go beyond, by providing the following contributions (as summarized 
in Figure 1): 
 
1. specifying the fundamental properties of the organizational attributes to be combined, so as 
to obtain an analog of the ‘periodic table of elements’ used in chemistry; 
2. providing a theory-based ex-ante prediction of what the effective (and eventually equifinal) 
combinations are, arguably an important scientific input to design; 
3. distinguishing what organizational elements in what combination are necessary and/or 
sufficient for performance, thereby escaping from a mere frequency-based approach to the 
identification of organizational configurations; 
4. using an innovative methodology to support such an approach (see data analysis section on 
Boolean comparative analysis).  
   
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
A Basic Chemistry of Organization: Organizational Elements and Combinatory Laws 
Classifying organization forms using any observable difference among real firms, or other 
institutions, is a useful part of organization science, as much as the classification of species is a 
useful part of natural science. We are proposing to complement it with a theory-based chemistry of 
organization. The latter starts from some analogue of natural elements for getting to (and 
explaining) the fundamental structure of the matter. This is a revolution that organization theory has 
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not gone through yet. Organizations are artificial rather than natural systems though. So we 
conceive organizational chemistry as a ‘science of the artificial’ (Simon 1969), whose laws set 
limits and give basic guidelines on how to design effective systems, rather than only describing 
which substances any system may be composed of.   
The construction of the model will address first the definition of organizational elements and, 
second, the illustration of combinatory laws. 
 
Organizational elements  
Organization theory has focused, for a long time, on the measurement of the dimensions of 
organized ‘bodies’ or entities, rather than on the microscopic structure of elements composing them. 
Measuring the degree of centralization or formalization is certainly not useless, but it is like 
measuring the height and weight of a person, not the molecules composing her blood or tissue. As 
said, we wish to shift at the micro-level of components in order to distinguish them into ‘types’ or 
‘kinds’ with known properties.  
Because of its emphasis on attribute similarity/dissimilarity in kind, and the partially worked out 
connection with the principles of behavior infused into organized systems, we are going to use as a 
starting point the classification received from organizational economics among the following types 
of attributes:   
 
- ‘market-like’ attributes, including price-like devices and control by exit (Von Hayek  1945; 
Hirschman 1970; Zenger and Hesterly, 1997) capable of infusing ‘highly powered 
incentives’ and of coordinating action with minimal communication; 
- ‘bureaucratic’ attributes, including the Weberian ‘attributes’ of formal vertical and 
horizontal  division of labor and of coordination by rules, plans and central ad hoc decision 
making (Ouchi 1980; Williamson 1985), infusing predictability, transparency, and 
arbitration capacity while economizing on knowledge and information sharing; 
- ‘collective’ and ‘communitarian’ attributes, including peer group governance, knowledge 
and value sharing (common culture), joint decision making, and norms of reciprocity (Ouchi 
1980; Butler, 1982), infusing  identity, cohesion and complex problem solving capacity. 
 
We shall extend and refine this starting classification of attributes, though, by using insights 
from the organization theory tradition. In fact, organization theorists have observed at least two 
anomalies with respect to the three-fold classification of organizing attributes produced by 
organizational economics.  
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First, the ‘third type’ of attributes collapses together at least two organizing principles and 
techniques that are theoretically different in their properties and not highly correlated in practice: 
communitarian culture-based governance and democratic peer-group governance (Alvesson and 
Lindkvist, 1993). In fact, cultural elements have to do with the ‘programming of the mind’ 
(Hofstede 1980), the homogeneity of values and objectives (Schein 1985), the ‘communal sharing’ 
of artifacts, practices and knowledge (Fiske 1992). Communitarian governance integrates actors by 
homogenizing judgments and interests through identity building and knowledge sharing practices 
(Fiske 1992; Kogut and Zander 1996). By contrast, things like equally distributed property and 
decision rights (Butler 1982), participation and representation of different knowledge and interests 
in decision making (Lammers and Széll 1989),‘voice giving’ procedures, fair procedures and 
processes for conflict resolution (Greenberg 1990), are typical ingredients of democratic 
governance, aimed at integrating the different judgments and interests of multiple actors through 
representative devices, and as such are increasingly important in modern knowledge-intensive 
organization (Harrison and Freeman  2004).  
Second, the notion of ‘bureaucracy’, and even of ‘hierarchy’, as employed in organizational 
economics is also too broad and Weberian, and collapses together two modes of organizing that are 
known to have different properties and to be rather uncorrelated in practice: the structuring of 
activities through formal documents, standards and allocation of rights and obligations; and the 
specific configuration and source of those rights' allocations. In fact, a formal, and even 
hierarchical, structure can combine with ‘principals’ being at the ‘base’ (as in representative 
bureaucracies and cooperatives) (Gouldner 1954; Blau and Scott 1962) rather than at the ‘top’ (as 
usually assumed); and decision rights are often more centralized in informal systems (from family 
firms to informal sub-contracting) than in formal ones, also because decentralization in large 
systems requires formalization (Pugh et al. 1969).  
 
Hence, we shall distinguish democratic elements from bureaucratic rule-like elements on one 
side, and from communitarian elements on the other. As a result, we stipulate that there are 
‘differences in kind’ among at least four types of organizational elements so defined:  
  market-like elements, including price-like and control-by-exit devices;  bureaucratic elements, including formal rules and plans, and articulation of the division 
of labor;   communitarian elements, including knowledge and value sharing, and common culture;   
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 democratic elements, including the allocation of ownership, decision and representation 
rights.  
 
It’s important to make clear and stress a couple of features of this typology, which is going to 
play the role of a ‘Table of elements’ in our chemistry of organization.  
First, the four categories are conceived as types of elements and not as types of institutions, or 
‘discrete structural alternatives’ themselves (as it is common thinking in new institutional 
economics). In the combinative approach that we are proposing, all real institutions are made of 
‘practices’ that embody these elements in various degrees – and usually further mixed up with other 
collateral ‘substances’ that may facilitate their absorption but are not central to our analysis (e.g. 
implementation devices, social acceptance caveats, and the like). 
Second, there is no pretense that this four-fold Table of elements is exhaustive or unique. Even 
in natural science new elements can always be (and have been) discovered; and classification 
systems with higher level of detail, or oriented to other purposes, can always be developed. This 
must be all the more valid for artificial elements. We are just proposing one way, rooted in previous 
analyses, of  classifying the humanly devised artifacts that are employed in organizing as ‘elements’ 
with known general properties, so that combinatory laws can be worked out. 
Third, elements are typically infused into organizational systems through the application of 
‘practices’. Any real practice can, in principle, embody more than one type of element. However, 
for the purpose of simplicity, in the operationalization of the framework in the empirical study 
presented in this paper, we will select and measure practices that can be considered ‘carriers’ of one 
(dominant) element. For example, ‘pay for performance’, and ‘outsourcing’ practices will be 
considered carriers of market-like elements. More refined analyses with multi-element practices 
would certainly be possible and worthwhile, but would not change the logic of the model.  
Fourth, in order to provide a usable chemistry, each element will be further characterized by a 
number, as in chemical formulas, indicating how many atoms of that element characterize the 
formula. Thus, convening to indicate elements in capital letters and the number of doses (or atoms) 
with a small subscript, the generic organizational formula  can be written in the form Mx- By – Cz – 
Dw.  In the empirical study, we propose a way of operationalizing and measuring the notion of ‘one 
dose’ or ‘one atom’ of an element.  
The relationships between types of organizational elements, the principles of behavior they 
infuse into organization, and a set of contemporary relevant organizational practices predominantly 
containing each element are summarized in Table 1, along with the references to the studies that 
have highlighted and documented those relationships. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Combinatory laws 
The dominant hypothesis in organizational economics about combinatory laws is that 
complementarities mainly stem from similarity. Hence, the less varied in kind the practices are in 
the same system, the better (Williamson 2004). Even though in the Milgrom and Roberts (1995) 
seminal article, there is no explicit theoretical argument suggesting that complementarity should 
stem from similarity, they also end up, in their examples, considering practices ‘of the same kind’ 
as complementary  – e.g. ‘mass production’ practices versus ‘flexible manufacturing’ practices. 
   However, empirical research, including that inspired by the complementarity view, has yielded 
results that suggest elements of different kinds can be successfully combined.   
For example, Whittington et al. (1999) examined the performance effects of the introduction of a 
wide portfolio of practices in a wide sample of 500 European firms, finding that the wider and more 
differentiated the set of practices introduced, the better. Practices are distinguished as pertaining to 
firm boundaries, structures or processes (hence, not as they are different in kind or logic, but as they 
invest different aspects of organization). Still, results support the contention that organizational 
changes realized through a set of practices encompassing different classes have affected firm 
performance more positively. The design implication would be that, for example, adopting together 
outsourcing (a boundary spanning practice), delayering (a structural practice) and teamwork (a 
process practice), should be better than, say, restructuring by delayering, horizontal integration and 
decentralization (a set of practices all of the structural kind). Even more pertinent to our purposes, 
researches on effective combinations of HRM practices have consistently shown that the most 
successful innovative organizations employ things as different as strongly powered incentives and 
teamwork together (Laurse and Manke 2001; Ichniowski et al., 1997). 
Hence, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt that effective organizational 
combinations can be generated by a simple monotonic combinatory rule such as ‘the more similar 
elements are, the better’. At the same time, the opposite simple combinatory rule, i.e. ‘the more 
varied the combination of elements, the better’, is also doubtful: isn’t there any ceiling to the 
effective adoption of practices of different kinds? Can’t complementarities vary in sign (e.g. from 
positive to negative) depending on the intensity of adoption? Are complementarities ubiquitous 
among all elements or limited to only some of them? Under what conditions?  
All those questions led us to integrate the two simple laws mentioned above (and some others) into 
a more sophisticated set of combinatory laws, presented and justified below, together with some 
testable propositions derived from the laws, which are corroborated in the empirical study. These 
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laws are also much more precise than the available propositions on the relation between the variety 
of practices and the overall system performance. In fact, the proposed combinatory laws specify 
what types of elements, and at which level of intensity, are necessary and/or sufficient to generate 
what type of performance.  
 
‘Law of organizational core variety’. The presence of elements of different kinds is a necessary 
condition for an organizational formula achieving high performance of any sort. 
   
As it occurs in living natural systems, elements of different kinds (say iron or carbon), are typically 
needed at some basic normal level for combining in molecules performing basic functions, hence, 
also for delivering high performance of any kind. In artificial organizational systems, we can 
conjecture that a combination of incentives, formal rules of the game, right of appeal and sense of 
belonging, each present at some basic level different from zero, is necessary for the system to be 
able to function and deliver high performance of any kind. According to this hypothesis, 
organizational formulas should always include a ‘core’ in which all elements are present.  
This ‘law of core variety’ of organizational formulas can be operationalized in the following 
testable necessary condition for high performance: 
 
Proposition I. High performing combinations of practices should necessarily include at least one 
dose of each kind of element. The absence of any element is a sufficient condition for not observing 
high performance of any sort.  
 
As in natural systems, some dose of, say, iron in the blood is needed, but raising the presence of 
iron to unspecified levels is unhealthy. The adoption of many practices, all carriers of one type of 
element, raises the intensity of the presence of that type of element in the system. For example, if a 
firm introduces pay for performance, stock options, profit sharing, tournaments for positions, and 
high personnel mobility and turnover, the presence of market-like elements will increase with the 
number of practices of the same kind adopted. The benefits from increased pressure on results 
decrease due to limits in the possibilities of increasing efforts and finding new performance 
increasing actions (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). In addition behavior is likely to become 
dysfunctionally competitive: all unrewarded tasks are likely to be neglected (Roberts 2004); costs 
and negative consequences not directly borne are going to be disregarded (Windolf 2004), and   
extrinsic motivation is going to ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation (Osterloh et al. 2001). 
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This ‘law of decreasing marginal returns’ to investments in organizational practices infusing 
elements of the same kind, just illustrated for market-like infusions, is known to be valid for all the 
other elements as well, although usually not expressed in these terms. 
For example, to establish some rules and plans in a hypothetical ‘spontaneous order’ is likely to be 
generally necessary for  achieving better outcomes; but keeping adding procedures and controls to 
solve any problem quickly entails larger costs than additional benefits, as the conspicuous critical 
literature on  bureaucracy demonstrated (from Merton on). Analogously, some social cohesion is 
obviously valuable and efficient, but increasing investments in ‘common culture’, easily generate 
pathologies of ‘oversocialization’ and ‘groupthink’ (Janis 1972). Finally, although the use of 
democracy is by no means common in firms, there have been well known experiments in the 
infusion of democracy, even in large incorporated firms, such as, in the past at Volvo or Olivetti, or 
more recently and in higher doses, at Oticon and Semco. The Oticon case has been analyzed in 
some depth, and, according to our hypothesis, it has been documented that its reorganization, 
characterized by a rather full dismantling of bureaucratic practices and a rather intense infusion of 
democratic elements (Verona and Ravasi 2000); eventually ran into problems due to lack of 
incentives and rules (Foss 2003). Hence we state the following second combinatory law: 
 
‘Law of decreasing marginal returns to organizational homogeneity’. There are decreasing 
marginal returns, and, beyond some point, negative returns, to increases in the intensity of the same 
kind of element.  
 
Decreasing marginal returns to investments in practices infusing elements of the same type, 
therefore, should set a ceiling to the intensity of effective presence of each single element. But other 
forces are likely to limit the breadth of effective organizational formulas too. If in low doses 
different elements complement each other, at higher doses there are reasons to hypothesize that they 
may entail negative complementarities (‘dysinergies’ rather than synergies). In fact, people energy, 
cognitive capacity and behavioral flexibility is limited; hence, they are unlikely to be able to attend 
and respond simultaneously to strong incentives; to strong demands for identification; to intense 
requirements for rule following and the use of procedures; and to the right and duty to exert their 
best judgment; being highly entrepreneurial, highly solidaristic, highly compliant, and highly 
informed critical participating citizens at the same time.  In addition, practices are costly, and choice 
among alternative investments in different practices may become an issue as the total amount of 
investment increases. 
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If the above is true, then the following two further laws and third testable necessary condition to be 
met by high performing organizational formulas can be stated: 
  
‘Law of decreasing marginal returns to organizational variety’. There are decreasing marginal 
returns, and beyond some point, negative returns, to simultaneous increases in the intensity of all 
kinds of elements. 
 
Both laws of decreasing marginal returns should lead to ‘forbidding’ the possibility of observing 
organizational formulas with one or more elements at maximum level in association with high 
performance. Hence, an empirical regularity, and testable proposition, deriving from those laws 
should be that a sufficient condition for observing low performance is the violation of the law, and a 
necessary condition for success is the respect of the law. 
 
Proposition II. High performing combinations of practices should not be characterized by very 
high intensities of any element. The presence of any element in very high doses should be sufficient  
for not  observing high  performance of any sort.  
  
The laws identified so far settle upper and lower bounds to the effective intensity of presence of 
elements in organizational formulas. Can we specify some further law predicting and prescribing 
which combinations to adopt, within those limits, in order to achieve specific outcomes?  
Different elements infuse different principles of behaviour, hence the differential investment in one 
or the other (within the specified healthy ranges) can give a dominant orientation to the organization 
that may be more or less suitable for reaching different types of outcomes. The selection and pursuit 
of different performance parameters should generate complementarities among different sub-sets of 
elements that fit best to produce those outcomes. Hence, the type of outcome sought (and eventually 
other contingencies to be met) should be relevant for the choice of the element(s) in which to invest 
beyond the basic level (and below extreme levels). The relative weight of the different elements, 
between a basic level at which they are all necessary, and a very high level at which they are all 
dysfunctional, is what can characterize and distinguish a contingently effective organizational 
formula from another. Hence we state: 
 
‘Law of structural heterogeneity’.  The optimal intensity of each element in an organizational 
formula (within the lower and upper bounds) is contingent to the type of performance outcome 
generated. 
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Proposition III. High performing combinations of practices should have the following structure:  a 
‘core’ in which all kinds of elements are represented at a basic level; and a ‘belt’ in which different 
kinds of elements are represented in higher doses, depending on the types of performances 
outcomes produced. 
  
Can we specify to some extent how the belt should be composed contingently to different outcomes 
to be produced? On the basis of available theory, and within the scope of the evidence that can be 
provided by the empirical study presented in this paper, we can advance two  initial  hypotheses on 
the composition of the ‘belt’ of organizational formulas. 
A leitmotiv in organization theory is that organization forms effective in innovation and exploration 
are different from those effective in efficiency and exploitation. As far as internal organization is 
concerned, bureaucratic organization has always been supposed to have a prominent capacity in 
achieving efficiency in exploiting existing knowledge and resources (Mintzberg 1979; Burns and 
Stalker 1961). 
By contrast, in the management of innovation, e.g. in organizing under high uncertainty, different 
contributions have alternately pointed out the virtues of investments and infusions into firms of all 
the other three classes of elements: either market infusions and incentive-driven organizing (Zenger 
and Hesterly 1997), communitarian governance (Ouchi 1979) and/or  organizational democracy 
(Harrison and Freeman 2004). These different accounts, and indeed the observable differences 
among the structuring of highly innovative firms, raise some questions of what’s behind this 
‘structural heterogeneity’: are incentive driven and communitarian/democratic arrangements 
alternative and fungible solutions in the generation of innovative behaviors (Roberts 2004)? Or, 
rather, would combinations among highly powered incentives and team-like organization generate 
even superior innovation performance, revealing that investments in those two elements are in fact 
complementary in the generation of innovation (Laursen and Manke 2001)? The empirical study 
presented in the remainder of the paper will shed some light on the problem of structural 
heterogeneity in the governance of innovation. 
 
Proposition IVa.  Highly efficient combinations of practices should be composed of a ‘core’ in 
which all elements are present, and a ‘belt’ of additional bureaucratic elements. 
Proposition IVb.  Highly innovative combinations of practices should be composed of a ‘core’ in 
which all elements are present and a ‘belt’ of communitarian, and /or democratic and/or market-
like additional elements.  
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From Organization Forms to Organizational Formulas: A Survey 
We illustrate how the approach can be applied and tested by the exploratory study reported in 
this section. In order to identify and analyze empirically whether the types of elements combine as 
predicted, we conducted a survey on a medium-sized sample of firms.  
 
Data Collection  
We conducted a survey on the population of the largest 600 independent firms by revenue and 
with more than 150 employees operating in Italy in the year 2004. We distributed to the chief 
human resources officers of these firms a questionnaire on organizational structures and practices, 
initially tested in a pilot study and in several interviews with more than 40 human resource 
managers and directors. The total number of respondent firms was 90 -with an overall response rate 
of 15%, comparable to other recent European surveys (Whittington et al. 1999). 15 out of the 90 
questionnaires collected were eliminated from the final sample for data unreliability due to the 
presence of missing data. Thus, our final sample involves 75 firms.  
 
Measures  
We designed the survey questionnaire following the table of correspondence between types of 
elements and observable practices introduced in Table 1 above. Data on the use of important 
contemporary practices for each element were gathered (for example, market-like type of elements 
has been identified by the following organizational practices: ‘individual and team-based pay for 
performance’, ‘firm-based pay for performance’, ‘outsourcing’, ‘internal labor market mobility’).   
The intensity of adoption of each organizational practice was measured in two ways.                          
For each organizational practice we identified a set of four more observable and operational sub-
practices (e.g. for the organizational practice ‘pay for firm performance’ the list of sub-practices 
included: gain sharing, profit sharing, stock options, employee shareholding). The intensity of 
adoption of the organizational practice was measured in two steps: first, the number of sub-practices 
adopted by the firm was counted, generating a 0 to 4 scale; second, this indicator was dichotomized 
into a dummy variable, coded as ‘1’ if the value of the indicator was equal or higher than the 
average value in the sample.  
There are however a few practices, such as turnover, whose intensity of use is commonly measured 
in firms on percentage scales. In those few cases percentage scales were used as a starting measure 
(e.g. the practice “Internal Labor Mobility” was measured as the number of job-reassignments over 
the number of employees). These scales were in any case also dichotomized into a dummy variable, 
coded as ‘1’ if the percentage value of the scale was equal or higher than the average value in the 
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sample. Hence, in the end, we have homogeneous indicators of the intensity of use for all practices.2 
In addition, we also have a homogeneous measure of the number of ‘doses’ of an element 
(operationalizing the idea of the number of atoms of an element): one dose is infused if the practice 
is used at least at average (i.e. normal) level. 
Given that we considered four practices for each element (see examples of practices in table 1), 
the intensity of use of any element can then range, potentially, from 0 to 4 in this study. We 
considered value 4 as ‘high intensity’ (the notion of ‘high intensity’ is relevant for testing 
Proposition II). This is justified as follows. First, we considered the maximum average intensity of 
application across all the four elements, and added the positive variance above it. This value is 3,57. 
Hence, in our sample, an intensity of 4 can indeed be considered very high.  At the same time, there 
are in the sample enough cases in which value 4 appears for testing the effects of ‘high doses’ on 
performance. Second, the questionnaire contained open questions giving respondents the 
opportunity to indicate the adoption of other practices beside the four explicitly identified for each 
element. No respondent in the entire sample indicated other practices. This evidence is a further 
indirect confirmation of the reliability of the above operationalization of 4 practices as ‘very high 
intensity” of an element3. 
As to organizational outcomes, in order to test our propositions, we considered two qualitatively 
different types of outcomes:  efficiency and innovation. They were measured independently 
integrating different database sources (Bankscope, Eurostat, Amadeus, Aida), in order to avoid self-
report biases. However, this concern forced us to use proxy indicators for which those data were 
available. Efficiency was measured by the revenue per employee of the firm in the year 2005 
divided by the average level of revenue per employee of the firms operating in the same industry 
(identified by the SIC-CODE) in the same year. Innovation was measured as the number of 
trademarks deposited by the firm in the year 2005 divided by the average number of trademarks 
deposited by the firms operating in the same industry (identified by the SIC-CODE) in the same 
year.  These ratio scales were dichotomized into dummy variables (1/0), coding each variable as 1 if 
above the average value of the ratio in the sample, and as 0 otherwise. Performance was measured 
with reference to 2005 to allow a one-year time lag between organizational arrangement (as adopted 
in 2004) and performance, as contingency studies’ methodology suggests (Donaldson, 2001).   
 
 
                                                 
2
 A more refined measurement could have also considered the percentage of employees touched by the practice. 
Unfortunately respondents were unable to provide this type of data reliably.  
 
3
 In other contexts, the number of practices representing ‘high intensity’ may be different. 
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Data Analysis Method and Findings  
The choice of the data analysis method was driven by the need for detecting interaction effects 
among the four types of elements, the possible equifinality of different combinations for reaching 
the same outcome, and the possible redundancy of elements for outcome generation. 
Standard methods -such as linear regression analysis and multivariate techniques as factor and 
cluster analysis are not able to adequately take into account all these factors. Although interaction 
effects have enriched standard linear regression to assess non-linear relationships, they nevertheless 
estimate the fitness of a single path to an outcome. Thus, they are in explicit contrast with the 
concept of equifinality (Fiss 2007). Furthermore, three-way interactions currently represent a limit 
for regression analysis applications – and concerns about their interpretation and reliability persist 
(Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Ganzach 1998). Finally, cluster and factor analytic methods are 
unable to distinguish which independent variables are necessary, sufficient or redundant in affecting 
the dependent variable. 
For these reasons, we decided to turn to new methods able to overcome these limits.                         
In particular, we found Boolean comparative analysis (Ragin 1987; 2000) the most suitable for our 
purposes. In fact, this is, by design, a methodology and a technique for detecting the combinations 
of elements that are necessary and sufficient for obtaining a specified outcome (Braumoeller and 
Goertz 2000; Fiss 2007). The methodological passages necessary to understand the study are 
exposed together with the findings of the data analysis4.  
 
Formalizing Data into Organizational Formulas through Boolean Algebra 
Combinations of elements can be expressed in the Boolean algebra language and its operators in 
the following way. Suppose a firm is adopting three market-like elements, two bureaucratic, one 
communitarian and one democratic element, and that it is classified as high performing in 
efficiency. This case can be formalized as follows: 
 
M3*B2*C1*D1 ---> EFFICIENCY 
 
where "*" denotes the Boolean operator "AND", ---> denotes the logical implication operator and 
the number qualifying  each capital letter (M = Market-like; B = Bureaucratic; C = Communitarian; 
D = Democratic) represents the number of doses (practices employed beyond the average level) 
                                                 
4
  For further understanding the basic concepts and procedures employed in Boolean Comparative Analysis (BCA), we 
refer the interested reader to the short illustration provided on the topic in the appendix posted on the authors’ website 
www.crora.unibocconi.it (Homepage > English site > A chemistry of organization appendix). Fs/QCA, the software 
used for the analysis, and more information on the methodology are available on the website www.fsqca.com.  
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employed for each of the four types of elements. The above statement can be read as "The 
combination of three doses of market AND two of bureaucracy AND one of community AND one of 
democracy can be observed in association with a high efficiency outcome".  
Let's now suppose that in our sample there is another firm that adopts a different formula and 
also achieves high efficiency, such as M1*B3*C2*D2. The presence of these two firms in our sample 
can be formalized through the Boolean operator “OR” (+): 
 
M3*B2*C1*D1 + M1*B3*C2*D2 ---> EFFICIENCY 
 
where "+" denotes the logical operator "OR". The above statement can be read as: “A high 
efficiency outcome can be observed in association with the combination of three market-like AND 
two bureaucratic AND one communitarian AND one democratic doses; OR in association with the 
combination of one market-like AND three bureaucratic AND two communitarian AND two 
democratic doses of elements.  
Thus, when used on sufficiently large sets of possible combinations, the "OR" operator 
expresses substitutability (or equifinality), while the ‘AND’ operator expresses relations of 
simultaneous necessity or complementarity. 
Using these notations, we formalized our dataset into a set of organizational formulas and 
explored their association with high performance on efficiency and innovation.5 
 
Testing Proposition I and II   
The second step of the analysis should answer the question: are there combinatory patterns 
common to the equifinal combinations associated to the same type of outcome? Do they conform to 
the propositions derived from the combinatory laws hypothesized?  
Our propositions can be best tested distinguishing between necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Ragin 1987).  Expressed more operationally:  
 
- Proposition I states that  the presence of all four elements at some level different from zero 
should be a necessary (albeit not sufficient) condition for observing  a positive outcome 
(high performance in our study) on any performance parameter (efficiency and innovation in 
our study);  
                                                 
5
 The tables summarizing all the organizational formulas detected in the sample are provided in the Appendix posted on 
the authors’ website www.crora.unibocconi.it. 
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- Proposition II states that the presence of any element at very high level (level 4 in our study) 
should be a sufficient (albeit not necessary) condition for observing negative outcomes on all 
performance parameter (no high performance on any parameter). 
 
Then , we further operationalized the combinatory rules constructing a dummy variable –labeled 
"ALLTYPES_1or2or3"- that was coded as "1" if all the four types of elements are used in a 
combination, each with a number of practices greater than 0 and lower than 4; it was coded as "0" 
otherwise. According to our hypotheses, we expect the positive values of the variable to constitute a 
necessary condition to achieve positive organizational outcomes, whereas the negative values to be 
a sufficient condition for negative outcomes.  A condition is said to be necessary if the outcome can 
be observed if and only if the condition is present, and is said to be sufficient if the presence of the 
condition implies the presence of the outcome. Expressed this way, the notions are deterministic. 
However, it is possible to express them in a probabilistic way, more compatible with an empirical 
test (it would be almost impossible to satisfy these rules with probability one, i.e. in 100% of the 
cases). A threshold of frequency lower than 100% can be fixed expressing this notion of 
‘statistically necessary’ and ‘statistically sufficient’. A threshold usually employed in Boolean 
Comparative Analysis studies is 65% (Ragin 2000: 109), so we adopted this heuristic.  
The actual proportion of cases conforming to our rules is in any case usually much higher (80-
90%). The results of the necessity and sufficiency tests6 are reported in tables 2 and 3 below. 
 
TABLE 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results are clear-cut in confirming the core combinatory rules hypothesized, and interesting in 
the refinements they suggest. They read as follows: 
 
 The respect of the combinatory rule ‘all types of elements should be present, with values 
comprised between a lower and an upper bound’ (operationalized as 1 and 3 in this study) is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for high efficiency. Any violation of this rule (e.g. the use of 
zero or four elements per type) is a necessary and sufficient condition for lower efficiency.  
- The respect of the combinatory rule ‘all types of elements should be present with values 
between a lower and an upper bound’ (operationalized as 1 and 3 in this study) is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for high innovation. Any violation of this rule is a  sufficient but not 
necessary condition for lower innovation. 
                                                 
6
  For a detailed understanding of the necessary and sufficiency tests employed in the analysis we refer the interested 
reader to Ragin (2000: 109-119). 
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- If we consider a joint outcome function, i.e. achieving both efficiency and innovation, of course 
the more restrictive among the conditions for each outcome determines the law for the joint 
outcome: the respect of the combinatory rule ‘all types of elements should be present with 
values between a lower and an upper bound’ (operationalized as 1 and 3 in this study)’ is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for achieving both high efficiency and high innovation (as 
for innovation only). Any violation of this rule is a necessary and sufficient condition for not 
achieving both outcomes (as for efficiency only). 
  
In other terms, the results indicate that any violation of either the law of organizational core variety 
or the laws of decreasing marginal returns to organizational homogeneity and heterogeneity is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for ending up with relative inefficiency. For innovation, respect 
of the rule is a necessary condition, but, even if respected, the high innovation outcome may not 
occur. This is an interesting and sensible asymmetry between organizing for efficiency and for 
innovation: as innovation is uncertain by definition, the link between organizational solutions and 
the outcome is weaker than for efficiency.   
 
Testing Proposition III and IV   
The analyses presented here inquire into the composition of effective organizational formulas 
within the lower- and upper- bounds specified by the core combinatory laws tested above. 
Operationally, the hypotheses we developed in that respect lead to expect the following: 
 
- Proposition III predicts that the ‘belt’ of organizational formulas, beyond the core, should be 
composed of different elements depending on the type of outcome.  
- Proposition IVa and IVb specify that bureaucratic elements should prevail in the belt of efficient 
formulas, while the other three elements should prevail in the belt of innovative formulas.  
 
To test these propositions, we first constructed two dummy variables for each element: LOW (1 
dose of the element is present), MED (2 or 3 doses are present). 
The expectation is that we should observe levels of bureaucracy beyond the base rate (hence at level 
2 or 3) in ‘efficient’ formulas; while in ‘innovative’ formulas we should observe those higher levels 
in the other three elements. The results of the analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
separately conducted for the three levels of presence of each element, are reported separately for 
efficiency, innovation, and both efficiency and innovation, in tables 4, 5, 6, respectively. 
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TABLE 4, 5, 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
As predicted by Propositions III, VIa and VIb, operationalizing the law of structural 
heterogeneity, the rules of composition of organizational formulas beyond the core, are qualitatively 
different for the two types of outcomes: for efficiency, additional doses of bureaucracy are 
necessary; for innovation, additional doses of either or both community and market elements are 
necessary (Tables 4 and 5).  The necessary conditions for getting both results are a union of those 
separate conditions, hence additional doses of all three elements, bureaucratic, communitarian and 
market-like are necessary (Table 6).  
Results indicate that as the result parameters broaden, the number of necessary elements and the 
necessary internal variety of the organizational formula increase. Results also suggest that negative 
complementarities among three types of elements, traditionally considered to be ‘inconsistent’ 
(because of their difference in kind), do not actually arise even at sustained levels of use (level 3). 
They might arise at very high levels (level 4), but at those levels even the use of ‘consistent’ 
(similar in kind) elements is not healthy.  
Finally, our empirical evidence suggests that ‘incentive-driven organization’ and 
‘communitarian organization’ are neither mutually exclusive structural alternatives nor strictly 
complementary in the governance of innovation. Elements of market and community seem to 
behave more like fungible substitutes, as (the belt of) organizational formulas generating high 
innovation can be composed by either elements of market, or of community, or of both without the 
outcome being altered. This fungibility in sustaining innovation seems to apply to some extent also 
to the use of democratic elements: the results are in the predicted direction although the test is not 
strictly significant (0.519). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion   
A chemistry of organization, whose foundations have been laid down in this paper, provides two 
much needed ingredients for a ‘science of design’ intended as a set of rules capable of generating 
organizational configurations: what the fundamental organizational elements to be combined are, 
and which the combinatory rules for generating specified outcomes are. We have shown that some 
general, invariant, laws can be specified and that high performing organizational formulas seem to 
obey to them, in spite of and beyond their variety. This approach focuses on the scientific part of 
design, namely on the basic chemical laws that any design should respect, even though the full 
specification of organizational solutions cannot but involve the application of other criteria as well, 
including aesthetics or politics. The very understanding of the ‘technical’ laws not to be violated 
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should actually enable more healthy and creative application of artistic or political criteria.             
A chemistry of organization, as initially operationalized and tested in this study, already provides 
precise and strong rules for organization design, which can be summarized as follows.  
 
- Effectively designed systems, both for efficiency and for innovation, should be composed of 
organizational attributes of different kinds, rather than of all attributes of the same kind; 
- The more varied the type of outcome sought, the more varied the organizational elements to be 
infused; 
- There is asymmetry between designing organization for efficiency and for innovation: as 
innovation is uncertain by definition, following design rules is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for high innovation; while it is possible to identify necessary and sufficient conditions 
for high efficiency. Organizational formulas capable of generating high efficiency are enriched 
in bureaucracy, while those generating high innovation are enriched in market-like or 
communitarian elements (or both).  
 
Our study is the first in its kind.  Therefore, it can be extended and refined in a variety of ways, 
such as the following: 
 
- The empirical data analyzed here are limited in time and space. They provide an explorative 
and illustrative analysis, but more extensive testing would naturally be important. 
- The ‘table of elements’ can be refined by further breaking down the types of elements into 
more micro elements (e.g. prices, rules, teams, etc.). 
- This paper has considered the link between organizational elements and types of outcomes. 
A possible straightforward extension of this type of analysis would be to consider some 
other relevant elements that are likely to interact with organizational elements.                 
The characteristics of technology, tasks and resources are obvious candidates. These 
variables can be plugged into Boolean analytic terms as further types of elements to explore 
necessary and sufficient associations with organizational elements.   
- At a more general, modeling level, we should observe that the model developed here is 
static. Although a good statics is a necessary initial step for developing any good dynamics, 
it would indeed be desirable and interesting to understand how the combinations can change. 
The specification of whether any element, or package of elements, is necessary or sufficient, 
and which elements are substitutable, provide a starting basis for developing dynamic 
models. On these grounds it contributes in refining the rough hypothesis that has been 
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typically derived from complementarity-based analysis: namely, that ‘the wider the package 
of practices that are changed together, the better’ (Whittington et al 1999). This may be a 
sensible strategy only if it is not known where the complementarities lie. Knowing the 
chemistry of combinations would allow devising partial, more targeted, less costly changes.  
 
In conclusion, two general implications of a chemistry of organization for the future direction of 
organization theory as a science of design can be highlighted. First, it provides a basis for enriching 
the available theories of ‘structural contingency’ with a theory of ‘structural heterogeneity’. Second, 
by going beyond the traditional archetypical, frequency-based, discrete notion of ‘organization 
form’, a chemistry of organization provides a basis for devising new possible configurations, 
thereby reconnecting to Herbert Simon’ notion of design as a science of the artificial concerned 
with the ‘world as it might be’. 
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Figure 1 - The Need for a Combinative Approach to Design 
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Table 1 – Organizational Elements, Principles of Behavior and Practices 
 
Types of 
organizational 
elements 
 
 
(Classes of pure chemical 
elements) 
 
 
Principles of behavior 
infused into the 
organization by the 
element 
 
(Active principles infused 
into the organism) 
 
 
Practices 
predominantly 
embodying the 
element 
 
(Drugs) 
 
 
References 
 
Market-like Elements 
Price-like and 
Control-by-exit devices  
 
 
Infusing highly powered 
incentives and capacity of 
coordinating action with 
minimal communication 
  Pay for performance 
(individual and 
team-based)  Pay for performance 
(firm-based)  Outsourcing  Internal labor 
mobility 
 
 
Von Hayek 1945 
Hirschman 1970 
Williamson  
1975; 1993 
Zenger and 
Hesterly 1997 
 
 
Bureaucratic Elements 
Formal rules and plans; 
Specialized division of 
labor 
 
 
Infusing predictability, 
transparency and 
accountability 
 
  Formal Evaluation 
System  Formal rules,  
procedures and 
programs  Articulation of  
formal structure  BPR and process  
organization 
 
 
Gouldner  1954 
Blau and Scott 
1962 
Pugh et al 1969 
 
 
Communitarian 
Elements 
Knowledge and value 
sharing, common culture 
 
 
 
Infusing identity and 
cohesion, homogenizing 
judgments and interests 
 
 Knowledge sharing 
practices  Community building 
policies  Teamwork  Project-based self- 
organization 
 
Hofstede 1980 
Ouchi 1980 
Kogut and Zander 
1996 
 
 
Democratic Elements 
Allocation of ownership, 
decision and 
representation rights 
 
 
 
Infusing voice and fairness, 
integrating different 
judgments and interests  
  Job enrichment and 
empowerment  Diffusion of 
ownership   Diffusion of  
decision and reward 
rights to units  Diffusion of 
representation rights 
 
 
Gouldner 1954 
Lammers and Szell 
1989 
Blair 1995  
Harrison and 
Freeman 2004 
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Table 2 – Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for High Efficiency and Innovation 
(Condition tested: All the elements are used with a number of practices greater than 0 and lower than 4) 
 Necessary Conditions Sufficient Conditions 
Outcome tested Condition7 
 
N  
 
Observed 
proportion Z p 
 
High Efficiency 
(N=37) 
alltypes_1or2or3 4 0.11   
 
Sufficient Condition: 
 
ALLTYPES_1or2or3 
 
 ALLTYPES_1or2or3 33 0.89 2.91 0.002* 
High Innovation 
(N=18) 
alltypes_1or2or3 1 0.06   
 
Sufficient Condition: 
 
No Sufficient Cause Found 
 
 ALLTYPES_1or2or3 17 0.94  0.005* 
High Efficiency and 
Innovation 
(N=11) 
alltypes_1or2or3 0 0.00   
 
Sufficient Condition: 
 
No Sufficient Cause Found 
 
 ALLTYPES_1or2or3 
11 1.00  0.009* 
  Test Proportion: 0.65, p< 0.05  Test Proportion: 0.65, p< 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Capital letters indicate the presence of the condition; non-capital letters indicate the absence of the condition. 
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Table 3 - Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Absence of High Efficiency and Innovation  
(Condition tested: All the elements are used with a number of practices greater than 0 and lower than 4) 
 Necessary Conditions Sufficient Conditions 
Outcome tested Condition8 N  Observed proportion Z P 
 
Not-Efficiency 
(N=41) 
alltypes_1or2or3 34 0.83 2.24 0.012* 
 
     Sufficient Condition: 
  
alltypes_1or2or3 
 
ALLTYPES_1or2or3 7 0.17 
  
Not-Innovation 
(N=60) 
alltypes_1or2or3 37 0.62    Sufficient Condition  
alltypes_1or2or3 
 ALLTYPES_1or2or3 23 0.38   
Not-efficiency 
and Not-
Innovation 
(N=34) 
alltypes_1or2or3 33 0.97 3.74 0.000* 
 
Sufficient Condition: 
  
alltypes_1or2or3 
 
ALLTYPES_1or2or3 1 0.03   
  Test Proportion: 0.65, p< 0.05  Test Proportion: 0.65, p< 0.05 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Capital letters indicate the presence of the condition; non-capital letters indicate the absence of the condition. 
Table 4 - Necessary Cause Analysis for High Efficiency 
Variable N Observed proportion Z P 
Lowmkt 29 0.78 0.28 0.388 
LOWMKT 8 0.22   
Lowbur 34 0.92 2.18 0.015* 
LOWBUR 3 0.08 
  
Lowcom 25 0.68   
LOWCOM 12 0.32   
Lowdem 29 0.78 0.28 0.388 
LOWDEM 8 0.22   
Medmkt 9 0.24   
MEDMKT 28 0.76 -0.09 0.462 
Medbur 5 0.14   
MEDBUR 32 0.86 1.42 0.077 
Medcom 13 0.35   
MEDCOM 24 0.65   
Meddem 11 0.30   
MEDDEM 26 0.70   
 
                   Number of Cases Tested (Outcome>0): 37 ( 47.4% of Total). 
                   Test Proportion:  0.75 
                   Significance Level: *p < 0.05 
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Table 5 – Necessary Cause Analysis for High Innovation 
Variable N  Observed proportion 
Binomial 
P 
Lowmkt 18 1.00 0.006* 
LOWMKT 0 0.00  
Lowbur 16 0.89 0.135 
LOWBUR 2 0.11 
 
Lowcom 18 1.00 0.006* 
LOWCOM 0 0.00  
Lowdem 15 0.83 0.306 
LOWDEM 3 0.17  
medmkt 1 0.06  
MEDMKT 17 0.94 0.039* 
medbur 2 0.11  
MEDBUR 16 0.89 0.135 
medcom 0 0.00  
MEDCOM 18 1.00 0.006* 
meddem 4 0.22  
MEDDEM 14 0.78 0.519 
 
Number of Cases Tested (Outcome>0): 18 ( 23.1% of Total). 
Test Proportion:  0.75 
Significance Level: *p < 0.05 
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Table 6 - Necessary Cause Analysis  
for BOTH High Efficiency and High Innovation 
Variable N  Observed proportion 
Binomial 
P 
Lowmkt 11 1.00 0.042* 
LOWMKT 0 0.00  
Lowbur 10 0.91 0.197 
LOWBUR 1 0.09 
 
Lowcom 11 1.00 0.042* 
LOWCOM 0 0.00  
Lowdem 8 0.73  
LOWDEM 3 0.27  
Medmkt 1 0.09  
MEDMKT 10 0.91 0.197 
Medbur 1 0.09  
MEDBUR 10 0.91 0.197 
Medcom 0 0.00  
MEDCOM 11 1.00 0.042* 
Meddem 4 0.36  
MEDDEM 7 0.64  
 
Number of Cases Tested (Outcome>0): 11 (14.1% of Total). 
Test Proportion:  0.75 
Significance Level: *p < 0.05 
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